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
 Introduction
The theory of directed technical change, dating back to von Weizsäcker (/,
a) and Kennedy (), has recently received renewed attention (Acemoglu
, , Ch. , Irmen ). The basic argument is that factor prices influence
the direction of innovations along an innovation possibilities frontier. This note is
intended to suggest an alternative mechanism for explaining the direction of tech-
nical change. It is based on Nicholas Kaldor’s () “technical progress function,”
according to which the direction of technical change is determined by the rate of
capital deepening.
Kaldor’s technical progress function is a component of Kaldor’s growth theory.
As a severe flaw in this theory has been identified in von Weizsäcker (, b),
it fell into oblivion and is disregarded in modern expositions. Yet the technical
progress function is independent of the Cambridge theory of distribution against
which von Weizsäcker’s argument was directed. It can be transplanted into a
standard growth model as a replacement of the neoclassical production function.
The hybrid model so obtained accounts for productivity growth from the outset
and generates Harrod-neutrality quite naturally and without necessitating the usual
somewhat arbitrary additional assumptions regarding the direction of technical
progress.
The next section outlines the hybrid model. Section  discusses some empirical
aspects and modeling questions and offers a digression on the general problem of
modeling investment in growth models. Section  concludes.
 AHybridModel
. The Technical Progress Function
Consider a closed economy with two factors of production, labor N and capital
K . Denote output by Y and labor productivity by y = YN . The development of
labor productivity over time depends on the amount of capital employed per
worker, denoted by k = KN . The more the capital-labor ratio increases, the more
will labor productivity increase, but even without any such capital deepening, labor
 Leading modern textbooks such as Blanchard and Fischer (), Romer (), Aghion and
Howitt () or Acemoglu () do not mention it.
 I take the term “hybrid model” from Marglin () who used it for a number of different models.
The present model may be added to his list. This section draws on the first sections of Schlicht
().

productivity will increase somewhat. As Kaldor (, ) put it, “some increases
in productivity would take place even if capital per man remained constant over
time, since there are always some innovations – improvements in factory lay-out
and organization, for example – which enable production to be increased without
additional investment”.
The “technical progress function” formalizes these ideas. It gives the growth rate
of labor productivity as an increasing function of capital deepening. Denoting time
derivatives by a dot and growth rates by a hat, the growth rate of labor productivity
is yˆ = y˙y = 1y
d y
dt and the rate of capital deepening is kˆ = ˆ
(K
N
)= Kˆ − Nˆ . The technical
progress function gives yˆ as a function of kˆ:
yˆ =ϕ(kˆ) . ()
For kˆ = 0 (a constant capital-labor ratio), the increase in labor productivity is
positive, and it is increasing in capital deepening, but these increases are subject
to diminishing returns. As Kaldor (, ) explains, “there is likely to be some
maximum beyond which the rate of growth in productivity could not be raised,
however fast capital is being accumulated.” Hence the technical progress function
“is likely to be convex upwards and flatten out altogether beyond a certain point.”
These assumptions are formalized for the present purposes as follows:
ϕ (0)> 0, ϕ′ > 0, ϕ′′ < 0, ϕ′ (∞)= 0.
The technical progress function is depicted in Figure . It embodies the idea that
capital accumulation and technical progress occur jointly. The idea has been taken
up (and acknowledged) by Arrow (). It re-surfaced in some more recent AK
theories, often in truncated form, namely that “aggregate productivity depends
upon the aggregate capital stock” (Aghion and Howitt, , ). In contrast,
Kaldor assumes that even without capital accumulation, productivity increases
over time. This is is known as the “Horndal effect” and appears to be an empirical
regularity (Lundberg , Ohlin , Lazonick and Brush ). Further, the
technical progress function is assumed to be convex (ϕ′′ < 0). If it were linear,
it could be integrated and into a Cobb-Douglas production function (Hahn and
Matthews, , ). But the Cobb-Douglas production technology seems to
be ruled out by empirical findings (Antras, ). So convexity appears to be an
economically sensible assumption that has apparently obtained some empirical
support (Bairam, ). Note, however, that a convex technical progress function
cannot be integrated into a neoclassical production function (Hahn and Matthews,

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Figure : The technical progress function ϕ gives the increase in labor productivity yˆ as a function
of capital deepening kˆ.
, ). So it should be possible, in principle, to empirically check which view
fits the facts better. Unfortunately, and to the best of my knowledge, this has never
been tried.
Given labor productivity y > 0 and capital productivity x > 0, production can
now be described by a Leontief production function
Y =min{yN ,xK } ()
Both productivities, x and y , will vary over time, and the technical progress function
can be employed to describe these changes within an otherwise standard growth
framework.
Assume that labor grows with a rate ν≥ 0, the savings rate s is constant and
positive (s > 0), and the rate of depreciation δ is constant and positive as well (δ> 0).
Full employment of labor and capital implies yN = xK = Y . We start from such a
situation. With a savings rate s, savings are S = sY and the change in the capital
stock is savings S minus depreciation δK .
K˙ = sY −δK . ()
Dividing this by K and noting Y = xK , yields
Kˆ = sx−δ.

From this we obtain the rate of capital deepening kˆ as
kˆ = sx−δ−ν ()
which is the Solow equation, or accumulation equation, encountered in the stan-
dard growth model (Solow, , eq. ). It gives the rate of capital deepening as a
function of the output-capital ratio.
By definition, capital productivity x (the output-capital ratio) is x = YK =
y
k and
its growth rate is
xˆ = yˆ − kˆ. ()
The technical progress function () gives the increase in labor productivity as a
function of the rate of capital deepening. Hence the growth of capital productivity
can be written as a function of the rate of capital deepening as well:
xˆ =ϕ(kˆ)− kˆ. ()
Since the accumulation equation () gives the rate of capital deepening as a function
of the output-capital ratio, we obtain finally
xˆ =ϕ (sx−δ−ν)− (sx−δ−ν) . ()
This is a first-order autonomous differential equation that describes the develop-
ment of capital productivity x over time. It can be analyzed easily.
Without capital deepening capital productivity is x = 1s (δ+ν). Hence capital
productivity grows at the rate xˆ =ϕ (0) which is positive. On the other hand, for a
sufficiently high rate of capital deepening, the technical progress function flattens
out (limkˆ→∞ϕ
′ (kˆ)= 0). The difference ϕ(kˆ)− kˆ is dominated by the second term
and becomes negative (limkˆ→∞
{
ϕ
(
kˆ
)− kˆ}< 0). In the context of equation () this
translates into limx→∞ {xˆ} < 0. For continuity reasons there must exist a rate of
capital deepening γ, implicitly defined by
ϕ
(
γ
)= γ, ()
that generates a constant output-capital ratio. As the second derivative
d2
dγ2
(
ϕ
(
γ
)−γ) = ϕ′′ is negative, the expression (ϕ(kˆ)− kˆ)(k−γ) is negative
definite, and the root is unique.
With a rate of capital deepening of γ, equation () implies a output-capital
ratio
x¯ = 1
s
(
γ+δ+ν) . ()

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Figure : Capital deepening changes over time according to the difference between the change in
labor productivity yˆ =ϕ(kˆ) and the rate of capital deepening kˆ. For values of kˆ below γ, kˆ increases
and for values of kˆ above γ, kˆ decreases. The equilibrium at kˆ = γ is stable.
At this capital-output ratio we have xˆ = 0; so x¯ is an equilibrium (critical point)
of our differential equation (). If the rate of capital deepening is γ, the output-
capital ratio is such that the rate of capital deepening is equal to γ; further the
output-capital ratio will remain constant at x = x¯ over time.
Because
(
ϕ (sx−δ−ν)− (sx−δ−ν)) (x− x¯) is negative definite, the equilib-
rium x¯ is globally stable (in the sense of being asymptotically stable). Given any
initial value of x, capital productivity will approach this equilibrium value over time.
In equilibrium, capital productivity x will remain at x = x¯ and labor productivity
will increase by yˆ = γ. This is illustrated in Figure 
. The Direction of Technical Change
It is interesting to discuss the previous analysis within a standard framework, even
if this does not do full justice to Kaldor’s ideas.
Looking at the production function (), xˆ can be interpreted as the rate of
capital augmenting technical change and yˆ can be interpreted as the rate of labor
augmenting technical change. The difference yˆ − xˆ is the Hicksian bias in technical

progress and xˆ is the Harrod bias – it gives the deviation from Harrod neutral
technical progress (xˆ = 0), either capital augmenting (xˆ > 0) or capital reducing
(xˆ < 0). From () it can be seen that the Hicksian bias equals the rate of capital
deepening and the Harrod bias is a function of capital deepening. In particular, for
kˆ < γ, technical progress is capital augmenting and for kˆ > γ it is capital reducing.
In this sense, the rate of capital deepening determines the direction of technical
change.
If we follow Kaldor and assume that the rate of capital deepening is determined
by the supply of savings in relation to population growth, the outcome will always
tend to Harrod neutral technical change. In this sense, the technical progress
function, embedded in a neoclassical framework, offers an alternative mechanism
for generating Harrod-neutral technical change.
. Factor Prices and the Choice of Technique
While the equilibrium discussed in Section  has been derived without reference to
factor prices (the wage rate and the rate of interest), this does not imply that factor
prices are irrelevant for equilibrium. Rather, any equilibrium must be compatible
with cost minimization, and this implies specific factor prices. A simple way to
discuss this in the hybrid model is obtained by importing Kennedy’s and von
Weizsäcker’s reasoning about cost minimization and assume that a firm that faces
a choice between capital widening and capital deepening will try to settle for a
combination of both that maximizes the decline in unit costs.
The technical progress function implies that the firms have a choice between
capital widening and capital deepening, and this will affect their costs. A certain
amount of money can be invested in order to increase the number of workplaces
while keeping the amount of capital invested in each workplace constant. This
would be the case of pure capital widening. The capital-labor ratio would be left
unchanged, and technical change would be Hicks-neutral. The other possibility is
to invest into the existing workplaces in order to make them more productive. This
would amount to capital deepening. Depending on the rate of capital deepening,
 This kind of cost minimization may be termed “gradient cost minimization”, as opposed to
”present value cost minimization,” i.e. the minimization of the present value of total costs. It has been
proposed by Kennedy () and von Weizsäcker (/) and is employed here mainly because
of its simplicity and transparency, but also because it carries an intuitive appeal, as competition may
be envisaged as a gradient process. For completeness, Appendix  gives the solution to the problem
of present value cost minimization, and it is shown that gradient cost minimization and present
value cost minimization are equivalent in equilibrium but differ somewhat outside equilibrium.

the direction of technical change may turn out as capital augmenting (kˆ < γ),
Harrod-neutral (kˆ = γ), or capital reducing (kˆ > γ). The individual firm faces, thus,
a trade-off between the rates of labor and capital augmentation.
Unit costs z are the sum of labor cost and capital user costs per unit. Denote the
real wage rate by w , the real rate of interest by r and the rate of capital depreciation
by δ. These are taken by the firm as exogenously given. Hence labor costs per unit
are wy and capital user costs per unit are
r+δ
x . Unit costs are the sum of these:
z = w
y
+ r +δ
x
. ()
For a constant rate of depreciation, the change of unit costs over time is
z˙ =−w
y
yˆ − r +δ
x
xˆ− w˙
y
− r˙
x
.
In view of equations () and (), the change in unit costs over time is then deter-
mined by the rate of capital deepening:
z˙ =−zϕ(kˆ)− r +δ
x
kˆ− w˙
y
− r˙
x
.
The firms take the factor prices, as well as their changes over time, as exogenous and
aim to maximize the decline of unit costs over time. This amounts to maximizing
the expression zϕ
(
kˆ
)+ r+δx kˆ by selecting an appropriate rate of capital deepening
kˆ and leads to the first-order condition for a maximum
ϕ′
(
kˆ
)= r +δ
zx
.
The second order condition −zϕ′′ (kˆ)> 0 is satisfied.
With free entry, competition will eliminate pure profits, and unit costs will be
equalized to unit price, which is one. Hence we obtain z = 1 and
ϕ′
(
kˆ
)= r +δ
x
()
 This trade-off has been formalized in von Weizsäcker’s (/) “new technical progress
function” and Kennedy’s () “innovation possibility function”. Its inverse is used in Appendix
. Kennedy himself has noted the connection of the innovation possibility function and Kaldor’s
technical progress function: “Surprisingly enough . . . our innovation possibility function is really a
disguised form of Kaldor’s famous technical progress function. . . . if the technical progress function
is known, the innovation possibility function can be derived from it.” (Kennedy, , n).

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Figure : At the stable rate of capital deepening kˆ = γ the equilibrium profit share pi equals the slope
of the technical progress function ϕ′
(
γ
)
.
The expression r+δx gives the share of capital costs in total costs. Equation ()
determines the optimal rate of capital deepening by the condition that the slope of
the technical progress function equals the profit share pi= r+δx . This can be written
as
pi=ϕ′ (kˆ) . ()
This is the condition given by von Weizsäcker (/, ) and Kennedy (,
) for an optimal choice of the direction of technical change in a different guise.
We may think that such choices will be made by different firms. As the technical
progress function is assumed to be convex (ϕ′′ < 0), equation () tells us that an
increase in capital’s share will reduce the rate of capital deepening, and an increase
in labor’s share – the complement to capital’s share – will increase the rate of capital
deepening selected by each firm. This carries over to the aggregate. In equilibrium,
capital’s share pi is given by the slope of the technical progress function at the
equilibrium growth rate γ (Figure ).
 As the trade off between capital augmentation xˆ and labor augmentation yˆ is dxˆd yˆ =
ϕ′−1
ϕ′ , the
optimality condition () implies that this trade-off is equal to the ratio of labor’s share and capital’s
share.

The hybrid growth model can be described by the two equations () and ()
which give the system
xˆ = ϕ (sx−δ−ν)− (sx−δ−ν) ()
pi = ϕ′ (sx−δ−ν) . ()
The equation () may be further rationalized by considering the following
adjustment process. Denote the inverse function of the first derivative of the
technical progress function by κ (·). This amounts to
ϕ′ (κ (pi))=pi.
Hence κ (pi) gives the rate of capital deepening desired by the firms if the profit
share is pi. As ϕ′′pi′ = 1 and ϕ′′ < 0, we have κ′ < 0. The desired rate of capital
deepening is a decreasing function of the profit share. If we postulate that a supply
of capital deepening kˆ in excess of the desired rate of capital deepening κ (pi) entails
an excess supply of capital relative to labor, capital costs will decline and the profit
share will be reduced, and we arrive at the adjustment equation
p˙i=µ(kˆ−κ (pi)) ()
for some speed of adjustment µ> 0. As ∂p˙i∂pi =−µκ′ < 0, a sufficiently high speed of
adjustment µ guarantees that this adjustment to any time path of kˆ is stable.
 Discussion
. Kaldor’s Stylized Facts
Kaldor’s () has listed a number of “stylized facts” about economic growth. It is
largely accepted that any theory of growth should, as a first approximation, account
for these “facts” – it should be able account for balanced growth. The hybrid model
(), () does so without the need of additional assumptions:
. The capital/output ratio remains roughly constant. (Capital productivity x
converges to x¯ = 1s
(
γ+δ+ν), see () and Figure .)
 The function φ (x,pi) = (sx−γ−δ−ν)2 is a Ljapunov function for () and the function
ϕ (x,pi) = (sx−γ−δ−ν−κ (pi))2 is a partial Ljapunov function for (). Together they satisfy
the requirements for the moving equilibrium theorem given in Schlicht (, ). Hence the system
(), () is globally asymptotically stable.

. The profit share remains roughly constant. (As x converges to x¯, the profit
share converges to ϕ′
(
γ
)
, see equation (). This implies also that labor’s
share 1−pi remains constant.)
. The growth of labor productivity remains roughly constant. (It tends to γ,
see Figure .)
. The capital-labor ratio grows at a roughly constant rate. (It grows with
sx¯−δ−ν= γ, see Figure .)
. The rate of return on investment remains roughly constant over
time. (Equations () and () imply an equilibrium rate of interest
r = 1sϕ′
(
γ
)(
γ+δ+ν)−δ. )
. The real wage grows over time. (As labor’s share wy remains constant, the real
wage w will grow with the same rate as labor productivity y ; both grow with
γ.)
Thus the hybrid model presented here actually implies Kaldor’s “facts.” This does
not rule out that modifications may be introduced to fine-tune the model to other
developments; as would always be the case, with any model.
A further “fact” may be added to Kaldor’s list and is implied by the hybrid
model:
. The share of profits is less than  per cent. (The technical progress function
must cut the -degree line from above. Its slope at the intersection gives the
profit share pi and must be less than .5, see Figure ().) This proposition is
empirically supported (Giovannoni, ).
. The Neoclassical Twin
Much insight can be gained by abandoning model monism and interpreting actual
growth processes from several perspectives, such as the neoclassical or AK. This as
is nicely done in Aghion and Howitt (), for example. The hybrid model offers
a third perspective that may complement the others for such purposes.
The differences between the three approaches relate mainly to the modeling
of production and technological change, because all three approaches don’t differ
much with regard to consumer behavior: consumers who want to maximize lifetime
utility (or something else) are, in a steady state, basically faced with the same data:
an exponential growth of the real wage and a fixed rate of interest. Hence their

intertemporal decisions can always be modeled in the same manner. Regarding
issues like convergence between different economies, spillovers, and the long-run
determinants of growth, these model differ somewhat, but a detailed discussion of
these matters goes beyond the scope of the present paper and must be left to future
research.
The central theoretical difference between the hybrid model and both the
neoclassical models and the AK models concerns to the direction of technical
change. The problems pose themselves in similar ways in the AK models and in
the neoclassical models, but the discussion is better developed for the neoclassical
case. For this reason, it is perhaps apposite to illustrate this aspect by juxtaposing
the hybrid model and an analogous neoclassical model, its “neoclassical twin”. This
will be done in the following.
The neoclassical twin of the hybrid model is obtained by replacing the Leontief
production function () by a neoclassical production function. This production
function gives output Y as a smoothly differentiable function of labor input N
and capital input K . In order to account for growth, it must be time-dependent:
Y = F (N ,K , t ) . Further, F (·) is assumed to be linear homogeneous in N and
K . This permits to define the associated per-capita production function f (·) as
f (k, t ) := F (1,k, t ) which gives per-capita production y as a function of capital
intensity k: y = f (k, t ) . As the output-capital ratio is x = yk , we obtain from () the
Solow model in its standard form.
k˙ = s f (k, t )− (ν+δ)k. ()
For any given initial capital-labor ratio k0, equation () determines the time paths
of the capital-labor ratio k and labor productivity y . Although it appears that factor
prices do not enter the model (), this is not quite correct. In any equilibrium,
factor prices must be compatible with cost minimization. Given factor prices w
and r , the firms will determine a cost minimizing technique by selecting a capital
intensity that minimizes unit costs w+(r+δ)kf (k,t ) . This implies the marginal productivity
theory according to which the profit share equals the production elasticity of capital
pi= f
′ (k, t )k
f (k, t )
. ()
This corresponds to condition () in the hybrid model. Equations (), () de-
fine the neoclassical twin of the hybrid model (), (). Whereas the hybrid model
accounts for Kaldor’s stylized facts without ado, this is not true for the neoclassical
twin. Indeed, the key dilemma of the neoclassical twin is that it does not imply

anything. By postulating a suitable shifting of the production function over time,
the model can be made compatible with practically all conceivable developments,
including developments that conform to Kaldor’s stylized facts. In order to obtain
time-paths that conform to those “facts,” however, it is necessary to assume a very
specific shifting of the production function over time: we need to assume Harrod
neutral technical change in the relevant range (Schlicht, ). The sole justifica-
tion for this assumption is that it generates time-paths that accommodate Kaldor’s
facts. By this assumption the model is tweaked to deliver the desired result. The
model itself contributes nothing in this regard. Harrod neutrality “is just a special
case” (Hahn and Matthews, , ). As Aghion and Howitt (, n) put it:
There is no good reason to think that technological change takes [the
Harrod neutral] form; it just leads to tractable steady-state results.
More specifically, the production function must be specified as F (N ,K , t ) =
Ψ
(
eγtN ,K
)
which translates for the per capita production function to f (k, t )=
eγtψ
(
e−γtk
)
. The thus adjusted twin model now reads:
k˙t = seγtψ
(
e−γtkt
)− (ν+δ)kt ()
pit =
ψ′
(
e−γtkt
)
kt
ψ
(
e−γtkt
) . ()
This adjusted model (), () is the only formal solution that generates results
fitting Kaldor’s “facts.” With any production function f (·) that cannot be written
as eγtψ
(
e−γtk
)
, the model is incompatible with these “facts.”
It is easy to check that the time path
k¯t = eγt k¯0
with k¯0 as the root of ψ
(
k¯0
)= 1s (ν+δ+γ) is a solution to (). This is the balanced
growth path. Under the usual assumptions, k¯0 is unique and all solutions kt of ()
converge to kt in the sense that the ratio
kt
k¯t
approaches one for t→∞. 
 More precisely: with any other production function, equation () violates Kaldor’s “facts.” The
underlying theorem is Uzawa’s () steady state theorem. It has originally been proved under the
assumption that the marginal productivity theory () holds true. Schlicht () has shown that
the theorem can be generalized and holds true regardless of the theory of distribution employed.
In other words, the necessity of Harrod neutrality persists even if equation () that embodies the
marginal productivity theory is replaced by something else.
 See Appendix A .

Yet the assumption that technical progress takes the very special form
eγtψ
(
e−γtk
)
appears arbitrary. One way out is to assume right away that the
production function is Cobb-Douglas, but this conflicts with empirical evidence
(Antras, ). Another way out has been proposed by Irmen () who shows
that capital-augmenting technical progress can be accommodated with Kaldor’s
“facts” if adjustment costs of capital grow by a rate that happens to just compen-
sate the bias. However, this assumption appears as special as the straightforward
assumption of Harrod neutrality. A third, and perhaps more preferable, way to
reduce this arbitrariness has been proposed by von Weizsäcker (/,a)
and Kennedy (). They assume that that factor prices govern the direction of
technical change. The more abundant factor will become cheaper and technical
progress will be directed towards increasing the efficiency of the scarce factor. This
mechanism has been added to the basic neoclassical model by von Weizsäcker
(/), Samuelson (), and Drandakis and Phelps () to rationalize
Harrod neutrality. (Kennedy () and von Weizsäcker (a) employ a Leontief
production function.)
The argument is that capital augmenting technical change would make capital
increasingly abundant and labor increasingly scarce. Technical change will therefore
tend to eventually become Harrod neutral. This argument appears problematic
because the assumption of Harrod neutrality is now replaced the “innovation pos-
sibility function” that describes the trade off between labor augmenting and capital
augmenting technical change. As this trade off at the Harrod-neutral position
determines the shares of capital and labor, the trade off is critical but there is again
no good reason to assume that this trade-off is roughly stable. Such an assump-
tion would presuppose a knowledge about trade-offs among yet unknown future
technologies.
The results “depend on the invariance over time of the innovation possibility
functions, an invariance that is . . . difficult to swallow” (Kennedy, , ). It may
even be argued that the direct macro assumption of Harrod neutrality is preferable
over the trade-off argument because both would appear equally arbitrary, yet the
former is more transparent (Schlicht, , n. ).
Further, the assumption of a neoclassical production function is open to the
criticism raised in the capital controversy of the sixties. This is a severe shortcoming
that has induced some leading proponents of the neoclassical growth model to turn
to Austrian capital theory (von Weizsäcker , Hicks b, a), and others
to leave the field (Samuelson ). The hybrid theory sidesteps this problem.
Kennedy (, ) saw this as an advantage of his theory of technical progress (in
its multi-sector version):

. . . the theory neatly sidesteps all the difficulties that arise when relative
prices alter as a result of changes in the rate of interest, difficulties
exemplified by the recent concern about re-switching. Since in real life
changes in relative prices are brought about much more significantly by
technical progress than by changes in the rate of interest, it is reassuring
to have a theory in which the rise in the relative price of a factor leads
unequivocally to an economy in its use!
This carries over to the hybrid model.
. The Concept of Capital
One reason for Kaldor to develop the concept of the technical progress function
relates to the concept of capital. He argues that it is not useful to separate investment
in physical capital from investment in new technologies, because both usually go
together:
. . . the present model . . . eschews any distinction between changes
in techniques (and in productivity) which are induced by changes in
the supply of capital relative to labor and those induced by technical
invention or innovation – i.e., the introduction of new knowledge.
As his reason he gives:
The use of more capital per worker (whether measured in terms of the
value of capital at constant prices, in terms of tons of weight of the
equipment, mechanical power, etc.) inevitably entails the introduction
of superior techniques which require "inventiveness" of some kind,
though these need not necessarily represent the application of basically
new principles or ideas. On the other hand, most, though not all,
technical innovations which are capable of raising the productivity
of labor require the use of more capital per man – more elaborate
equipment and/or more mechanical power
and he continues:
It follows that any sharp or clear-cut distinction between movements
along a “production function” with a given state of knowledge, and
a shift in the”production function” caused by a change in the state
of knowledge is arbitrary and artificial. Hence instead of assuming

that some given rate of increase in productivity is attributable to tech-
nical progress which is superimposed, so to speak, on the growth of
productivity attributable to capital accumulation, we shall postulate
a single relationship between the growth of capital and the growth of
productivity which incorporates the influence of both factors (Kaldor,
, f).
As a consequence, the concept of capital must be seen as involving all outlays for
investment. The idea is that investment spending is optimally allocated between
development of new technology, and the installment of new production facilities.
(Such division has been modeled in the early neoclassical endogenous growth
models by Conlisk (, ) and Vogt ().) This view seems to accord with
current business practice, as the price paid for a new machine will cover both R&D
expenditure and production costs for that product. So our statistical data lump
these expenses together. From a practical point of view it appears, thus, reasonable
to employ Kaldor’s concept of capital instead of making a distinction between
physical and intellectual capital.
. Digression: TheMissing Investment Function
The hybrid model is, however, quite unsatisfactory in a different way, and shares
this deficiency with the neoclassical model (and the AK models): there is no
independent investment function. Rather it is assumed that the consumers’ savings
decision automatically translate into investment. Yet in a decentralized economy,
saving decisions are made by households, while investment decisions are made by
firms. So these decisions are made independently of each other, and it is necessary
to postulate a mechanism that equates savings with investment.
Regarding the neo-classical model, Hahn and Matthews (, ) remark on
that problem:
In its basic form the neo-classical model depends on the assumption
that it is always possible and consistent with equilibrium that invest-
ment should be undertaken of an amount equal to full-employment
savings. The mechanism that ensures this is as a rule not specified.
This assumption leads to severe problems regarding logical consistency, both of
the hybrid model and its neo-classical twin. In the following I shall simply outline
this problem for both models. As the problem remains unsolved, I cannot offer
any solution, but it may become apparent that taking the problem seriously might
open interesting theoretical prospects.

The problem involved here is that, by adding another equation to a fully spec-
ified model, the model becomes “overdetermined” in the sense that it contains
more equations than unknowns (Sen , Schlicht , Marglin , ). One
solution is to introduce another variable that can assume a value such that the new
equation can be made consistent with the initial model by a suitable adjustment of
this variable. In this case, the investment function would be inessential and could
simply be dropped. Hahn and Matthews (, ) have described this approach:
Most neo-classical writers have, however, had in mind some financial
mechanism. In the ideal neo-classical world one may think of there be-
ing a certain level of the rate of interest (r) that will lead entrepreneurs,
weighing interest cost against expected profits, to carry out investment
equal to full-employment savings. In the absence of risk, etc., the
equilibrium rate of interest would equal the rate of profit on invest-
ment; otherwise the rate of profit will be higher by the requisite risk
premium.
While such an argument sounds convincing, it is feasible neither for the hybrid
model nor its neo-classical twin.
In the hybrid model, the equilibrium rate of interest is determined by the slope
condition s(r+δ)(γ+δ+ν) =ϕ
′ (γ) and the equilibrium output capital ratio, see equations
() and (). This implies an equilibrium rate of interest
r = 1
s
ϕ′
(
γ
)(
γ+δ+ν)−δ.
So there is no room for varying the rate of interest such that the volume of in-
vestment is adjusted to savings. To achieve this, two rates of interest would be
needed: one to induce the correct choice of technique, the other to induce the
correct volume of investment.
In the neo-classical twin the problem is similar. The equilibrium rate of interest
that induces a cost minimizing choice of capital intensity in equilibrium is fixed as
r =ψ′ (k¯0)
with k¯0 determined as the root of ψ
(
k¯0
) = 1s (ν+δ+γ). So there is no room for
varying the rate of interest in order to adjust investment to savings here, just as in
the hybrid model.
Including a risk premium would not change matters, because the capital costs
relevant for the choice of technique will be the same as the capital costs relevant

for determining the level of investment: they are simply capital costs, whether with
or without a risk premium. From this point of view, solutions like those proposed
by Beckmann (, eq. ), von Weizsäcker (, eq. ), or Fischer (, eq. )
appear problematic.
Kaldor was aware of this problem. He thought that the technical progress func-
tion would permit getting rid of the over-determination problem by eliminating
marginal productivity theory. This would permit dropping the equations that
determine factor prices (() in the hybrid model or () in the neo-classical twin)
and thereby make room for the Cambridge theory of factor prices that builds on
the equalization of saving and investment. But this position is not tenable, as von
Weizsäcker (, b) has shown.
The classical assumptions about saving and investment would avoid the over-
determination problem: if the savings rate is equal to the profit share and all profits
are re-invested, savings and investment are always equal, and the problem vanishes.
Similarly, if the social planner decides about savings and investment simultane-
ously, the problem disappears. The problem emerges only with an independent
investment function.
Yet an independent investment function seems to be required in order to make
the argument that savings and investment are adjusted to each other. The assertion
that this happens automatically is appropriate for the classical assumptions about
savings and investment, or for the planning solution (the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans
models), but inappropriate in a monetary economy where saving decisions and
investment decisions are made independently of each other by different actors.
The introduction of an independent investment function may lead to interesting
prospects, though. To illustrate, consider the case that the equalization of savings
and investment requires a rate of interest r1, and that the proper choice of technique
requires a different interest rate r2 > r1. If monetary policy succeeds to establish
the interest rate r1, the desired rate of capital deepening would be too large. The
newly created jobs would be endowed with too much capital, and not enough
workplaces can be created with the given amount of investment; unemployment of
labor through capital shortage would result. In the converse case r1 > r2, the rate of
capital deepening would be too low, more jobs would be newly created than could
be manned, and a labor shortage would result.
Despite these potentially interesting and promising aspects, no systematic the-
oretical work has taken up these problems as yet and these and related ideas (for
instance, the possible role of the business cycle in solving the puzzle as in Schlicht
) remain speculation.

 Conclusion
The present note has been written in order to draw attention to Kaldor’s technical
progress function and to acknowledge it as a pioneering contribution to endogenous
growth that, although largely forgotten, provides an interesting and still relevant
alternative to current modeling. The substitution of the neo-classical production
function by Kaldor’s technical progress function in a standard growth model leads
to a hybrid model that provides an interesting alternative to standard growth
theory. It accounts for balanced growth without any further assumptions, while the
standard growth models need to be tweaked in a way by assumptions that amounts
to assuming the result.
Faced with different models of economic growth we ought, I think, refrain from
model monism and not insist that one particular model is the correct one and the
others are wrong. Rather we should appreciate various different approaches to
growth processes in their own right and discuss empirical findings in the light of the
alternative interpretations provided. Further, all current approaches to the theory
of growth, including the hybrid model presented here, are far from being acceptable
as something more than just a point of view because they leave important questions
unanswered, as has been illustrated in Section . about the missing investment
function. There remains plenty of work to do.
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Appendix : Cost Minimization
The model (), () has been derived, mainly for analytical convenience, under
the assumption that the choice of capital deepening maximizes the decline in unit
costs at each point in time (“gradient cost minimization”). In the following the
solution for cost minimization will be provided. It will turn out that gradient cost
minimization and full cost minimization are equivalent in a steady state, but differ
outside a steady state somewhat.
We start with the problem of minimizing unit costs at some future point in
time by selecting an appropriate time-path of capital deepening. The problem

has been originally posed (but not solved) by Samuelson (, ) in his version
of the Kennedy-Weizsäcker theory. For the hybrid model it can be solved by a
straightforward variational argument.
Define the function φ that describes the Kennedy-Weizsäcker trade-off between
the growth rates of productivities for capital xˆ and labor yˆ :
yˆ =φ (xˆ) . (A )
This frontier is implied by the identity xˆ = yˆ− kˆ and the technical progress function
yˆ =ϕ(kˆ) with γ=ϕ(γ). The function is implicitly defined by
φ (xˆ)=ϕ(φ (xˆ)− xˆ) (A )
and has the properties
φ (0) = γ (A )
φ′ = − ϕ
′
1−ϕ′ ∈ (−1,0) (A )
φ′′ = ϕ
′′(
1−ϕ′)3 < 0. (A )
Consider the problem to minimize unit costs at a future date T > 0 when starting
with labor productivity y0 and capital productivity x0 at time t = 0. Wages grow
along the steady state path according to
wt =w0eγt , (A )
the rate of interest r remains constant over time, and initial unit costs are one:
z0 = r +δ
x0
+ w0
y0
= 1. (A )
The firm wants to minimize unit costs at some point in time T > 0 by selecting
suitable time-paths of the increases in productivity growth xˆ and yˆ . As these time-
paths are constrained by the trade-off (A ), the problem reduces to selecting just a
time path xˆt . This entails the time path yˆt =φ (xˆt ) of labor productivity and the
time path kˆt = yˆt − xˆt of capital deepening. For ease of notation we denote the
change in capital productivity by
ut = xˆt (A )
and take this as the control variable that is used to minimize costs at time T .

Lemma. For any given T > 0, an optimal control u∗t that minimizes unit costs at time
T over the set of piecewise continuous controls is a constant control.
Proof. With control ut , the productivities at t = T are given by
xT = x0e
∫ T
0 utdt (A )
yT = y0e
∫ T
0 φ(ut )dt (A )
and the implied unit costs at time T are
zT = r +δ
x0e
∫ T
0 utdt
+ w0e
γT
y0e
∫ T
0 φ(ut )dt
. (A )
Assume that u∗t is optimal and consider any other possible control. It differs from
u∗t by
4t = ut −u∗t . (A )
We refer to 4t as a variation. Consider now the set of controls parametrized by ε:
U= {u∗t +ε4t ∣∣ε ∈ [−1,1]} . (A )
This set contains all convex combinations of controls u∗t and ut . In particular it
contains u∗t (for ε= 0) and ut (for ε= 1). Given some control u∗t and any variation
4t , the unit costs resulting from controls taken out of the set U are a function of ε:
zT (ε)= r +δ
x0
e−
∫ T
0 (u∗t +ε4t )dt + w0
y0
e−
∫ T
0 φ(u∗t +ε4t−γ)dt . (A )
The first derivative is
∂zT
∂ε
= −r +δ
x0
e−
∫ T
0 (u∗t +ε4t )dt
∫ T
0
4tdt − w0
y0.
e−
∫ T
0 φ(u∗t +ε4t−γ)dt
∫ T
0
φ′4tdt
= −
∫ T
0
(
r +δ
xT
+ wT
yT
φ′
(
u∗t +ε4t
))4tdt
The second derivative is strictly positive:
∂z2T
∂ε2
=−
∫ T
0
wT
yT
φ′′
(
u∗t +ε4t
)42tdt > 0

A necessary condition for a minimum is that the first derivative of zt vanishes at
ε= 0:
∂zT
∂ε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
=−
∫ T
0
(
r +δ
xT
+φ′ (u∗t ))4tdt = 0 (A )
Consider the possible variation
4t = r +δ
xT
+φ′ (u∗t ) . (A )
With this variation, the necessary condition for a minimum (A ) reads
∂zT
∂ε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
=−
∫ T
0
(
r +δ
xT
+φ′ (u∗t ))2dt = 0.
This implies φ′
(
u∗t
)=− r+δxT for almost all t ∈ [0,T ] and hence that u∗t is the same
for almost all t . Write this as
u∗t = u¯ foralmostall t ∈ [0,T ] . (A )
Proposition. Denote the initial profit share by pi0 = r+δx0 .
If pi0 =ϕ′
(
γ
)
, the optimal control is ut = u¯ = 0.
If pi0 >ϕ′
(
γ
)
, the optimal control is ut = u¯ > 0.
If pi0 <ϕ′
(
γ
)
, the optimal control is ut = u¯ < 0.
For T sufficiently large, the optimal control is arbitrarily close to ut = u¯ = 0.
Proof. With
r +δ
x0
= pi0
w0
y0
= 1−pi0
and a constant ut = u¯ (as implied by the Lemma), we obtain from (A ) unit costs
at time T as
zT =pi0e−u¯T + (1−pi0)e−(φ(u¯)−γ)T . (A )
This is to be minimized with respect to u¯. The derivatives are
∂zT
∂u¯
= −Tpi0e−u¯T −T (1−pi0)e−(φ(u¯)−γ)Tφ′ (u¯) (A )
∂2zT
∂u¯2
= T 2pi0e−u¯T +T 2 (1−pi0)e−(φ(u¯)−γ)T
(
φ′ (u¯)
)2+
−T (1−pi0)e−(φ(u¯)−γ)Tφ′′ (u¯) . (A )

As all terms in (A ) are strictly positive, any solution u¯ to ∂zT∂u¯ = 0 gives a unique
minimum of zT .
At u¯ = 0 we obtain
∂zT
∂u¯
∣∣∣∣
u¯=0
=−Tpi0−T (1−pi0)φ′ (0) .
This implies
∂zT
∂u¯
∣∣∣∣
u¯=0
T 0 ⇔ −φ′ (0)T pi0
1−pi0
and implies for the cost-minimizing solution u¯∗
u¯∗T 0 ⇔ −φ′ (0)S pi0
1−pi0
.
As −φ′ = ϕ′1−ϕ′ , this can be expressed in terms the technical progress function as
u¯∗T 0 ⇔ ϕ′ (γ)Spi0.
If we start with the equilibrium profit share pi0 =ϕ′
(
γ
)
, it is optimal to continue
with the rate of capital deepening γ. This will keep capital productivity constant
and labor productivity growing at the rate γ. If we start with a profit share pi0
that exceeds γ, it is optimal to select a rate of capital deepening less than γ that
entails growing capital productivity and a growth in labor productivity less than
γ. Conversely an initial profit share pi0 < ϕ′
(
γ
)
would require a rate of capital
deepening exceeding γ. All this is qualitatively similar to gradient cost minimization,
but the reaction will be much less pronounced.
To see this, consider the first-order condition for the minimizing solution u¯∗
more closely. It can be written as
pi0e(
φ(u¯∗)−γ−u¯∗)T + (1−pi0)φ′
(
u¯∗
)= 0. (A )
This gives u¯∗ implicitly as a function of pi0 and T . The partial derivatives of this
function are
∂u¯∗
∂pi0
= − e
(φ(u¯∗)−γ−u¯∗)T −φ′ (u¯∗)
Tpi0e(φ(u¯
∗)−γ−u¯∗)T (φ′−1)+ (1−pi0)φ′′ (u¯∗)
∂u¯∗
∂T
= −
(
φ (u¯∗)−γ− u¯∗)e(φ(u¯∗)−γ−u¯∗)T
Tpi0e(φ(u¯
∗)−γ−u¯∗)T (φ′−1)+ (1−pi0)φ′′ (u¯∗)

As the denominator in both expressions is strictly negative we have
∂u¯∗
∂pi0
> 0
∂u¯∗
∂T
T 0 ⇔ u¯∗S 0.
Therefore a higher initial profit share leads to a higher increase in capital productiv-
ity. This goes along with smaller rate of capital deepening. Conversely a smaller
share of profits leads to a higher rate of capital deepening. The larger the planning
horizon T , the less pronounced will be this reaction.
From (A ) we see further that for T →∞, the expression (φ (u¯∗)−γ− u¯∗)
must go to zero, because
(
φ (u¯∗)−γ− u¯∗)T must remain bounded and we conclude
that the optimal control u¯∗ must go to zero:
lim
T→∞
u¯∗ = 0.
In other words: If the firm wants to minimize costs in the very distant future, it will
select a rate of capital deepening very close to the equilibrium rate γ.
Hence gradient cost minimization used in Section . is only optimal in the
steady state. Outside the steady state it is optimal to react to differences between
the profit share and the slope of the technical progress function ϕ′
(
γ
)
in a less
pronounced, but qualitatively similar way. This qualitative result carries over to the
minimization of the present value of total costs, as this involves minimization of a
weighted average of future costs.
Appendix : Convergence in the Neoclassical Twin
In the following, the relative convergence of different solutions to the differential
equation () describing the neoclassical twin is shown. The function f is assumed
to satisfy the Inada conditions, and ψ inherits them: ψ (0) = 0, ψ′ > 0, ψ′′ < 0,
ψ′ (0) = ∞, ψ′ (0) = ∞, ψ′ (∞) = 0. This implies that for 1s
(
ν+δ+γ) > 0 the
equation
ψ
(
k¯0
)= 1
s
(
ν+δ+γ) k¯0 (A )

has a positive root k¯0 that is unique, and that
ψ(ξ)
ξ is a decreasing function of ξ.
Hence the expression
(
logξ− log k¯0
)(ψ(ξ)
ξ −
ψ
(
k¯0
)
k¯0
)
is negative definite:
(
logξ− log k¯0
)(ψ (ξ)
ξ
− ψ
(
k¯0
)
k¯0
)
< 0 forall ξ> 0 with ξ 6= k¯0. (A )
It is easy to check that the time-path
k¯t = eγt k¯0 (A )
satisfies ().
Define
ξt = e−γtkt . (A )
Equations () and (A ) imply
ξ˙t = sψ (ξt )−
(
ν+δ+γ)ξt . (A )
Consider now the relative distance between any solution kt of () and k¯t :
Vt =
(
logkt − log k¯t
)2
.
As kt = eγtξt and k¯t = eγt k¯0, this is identical to
Vt =
(
logξt − log k¯0
)2
.
The time derivative of this distance is
V˙t = 2
(
logξt − log k¯0
)
ξˆt
= 2s (logξt − log k¯0)(ψ (ξt )
ξt
−
(
ν+δ+γ)
s
)
.
Equation (A ) implies (ν+δ+γ)s =ψ
(
k¯0
)
and we can write
V˙t = 2s
(
logξt − log k¯0
)(ψ (ξt )
ξt
− ψ
(
k¯0
)
k¯0
)
which is negative whenever ξt differs from k¯0, see (A ). Hence all solutions of
() converge in the sense that the ratio of two solutions k ′t and k
′′
t approach unity.
(This does not imply that the distance between such solutions shrinks over time.)

